I explore the role of trust in acquisitions of entrepreneurial firms, taking a dyadic view that gives equal attention to buyers and sellers. The two parties have asymmetric views regarding whether their counterparts are trustworthy. I outline how these asymmetries emerge, persist, and influence behavior, including tendencies to behave deceptively and to guard against deception. I also find that buyers' and sellers' beliefs concerning whether their counterparts are trustworthy and trusting are often erroneous. I explore the implications of these findings for developing a theory of trust asymmetries and argue that selecting buyers on the basis of trust increases rather than diminishes entrepreneurs' vulnerability.
Interorganizational trust is a subject of substantial interest to organizational and management scholars. Previous research has focused primarily on trust in the context of long-term alliances, particularly long-lasting relationships between buyers and suppliers (e.g., Dyer & Chu, 2000; Sako & Helper, 1998; Saparito, Chen, & Sapienza, 2004) . Scholars have examined how trust develops between alliance partners (e.g., Doz, 1996; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) , influences subsequent partner selection (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) , and shapes outcomes such as governance structures (Gulati & Singh, 1998) , information sharing (Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1996) , satisfaction with partnerships (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Mohr & Spekman, 1994) , and financial performance (Luo, 2002) .
Interfirm trust has received much less attention in the context of an equally significant set of interorganizational transactions, mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Acquisitions are important strategic tools that enable companies to obtain valuable technology (Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006) , spur innovation (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Paruchuri, Nerkar, & Hambrick, 2006) , penetrate international markets (Birkinshaw, Bresman, & Hakanson, 2000; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001) , and reconfigure firm resources (Capron, Dussauge, & Mitchell, 1998 ). Yet, despite the importance of these transactions, mergers and acquisitions have received little attention in the organizational trust literature (Stahl & Sitkin, 2005) .
Similarly, trust has received little attention in the large literature on mergers and acquisitions. The M&A literature provides some hints that trust plays a role in mergers and acquisitions, but ultimately these hints raise more questions than they answer. Case study data suggest that acquisition targets favor acquirers they trust (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004) , and larger-scale studies indicate that acquisition deals are more likely to occur when a buyer and seller have a prior direct relationship (Schildt & Laamanen, 2006; Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, & Noorderhaven, 2002) or shared network ties (D'Aveni & Kesner, 1993) , circumstances that may foster trust (Gulati, 1995; Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1997 ). Yet despite these signs that trust may be present between buyers and sellers, authors have described deception by buyers as "standard practice" (Buono & Bowditch, 1989: 256) and noted that distrust often emerges after deals close (Buono, Bowditch, & Lewis, 1985; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991) , when buyers' "prior promises mean nothing" (Marks & Mirvis, 2001: 87) .
The apparent coexistence of trust and deception in acquisitions is puzzling. On the one hand, if buyer deception is common, it is not surprising that sellers would prefer buyers they trust. But if sellers favor buyers they trust, how can deception by buyers remain so common? If buyers and sellers often have prior direct relationships or shared thirdparty ties, why are sellers so often mistaken in their assessments of buyers? Moreover, knowing they are trusted by sellers, why do buyers not feel the sense of moral obligation to behave in good faith that has been observed in alliances (Larson, 1992) ? Why aren't buyers more concerned with the negative implications of deception for postdeal cooperation by acquired employees, or for their firms' reputations?
These questions are especially perplexing for acquisitions of knowledge-based, technology-intensive firms, an important source of innovation and growth in high-technology industries (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Puranam et al., 2006) . In knowledgeintensive markets, firm leaders have more discretion to choose their acquirers (Coff, 2003) , suggesting acquisition targets may be particularly able to select buyers they trust. Technology-intensive industries are often tightly networked (Castilla, Hwang, Granovetter, & Granovetter, 2000; Powell, 1990) , implying that sellers should have easy access to information about buyers. Moreover, the success of a technology-based acquisition depends on the continued presence and cooperation of acquired employees (Granstrand & Sjolander, 1990; Ranft & Lord, 2002) , raising the potential costs to buyers of behaving deceptively. These factors should make the coexistence of trust and deception even less likely.
In the current work, I seek to unravel these puzzles. The purpose of this study is to explore trust and deception in acquisitions of technology ventures, giving equal attention to the views of buyers and sellers. In examining these issues, I aim to address calls for more context-specific examinations of trust (Kramer, 1999; Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 2006; Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007) . I find that trust and deception can coexist in the context of acquisitions because of a complex set of asymmetries and errors in both parties' views regarding trust and trustworthiness. I examine how these patterns both emerge from and influence acquisition events and behavior. A central theoretical contribution of this research is a greater understanding of trust asymmetries, a topic that has been identified as a "pressing unanswered question" in trust theory (Gulati & Sytch, 2008: 277) . Prior interorganizational trust research rests on an implicit assumption that trust between partners is symmetric, yet it "has not examined the empirical validity of this assumption nor the antecedents and the outcomes of asymmetric trust in interorganizational relationships" (Zaheer & Harris, 2005: 193) . The current study begins to address these gaps by describing how trust asymmetries emerge, persist, and influence decision making and behavior in the strategically important setting of mergers and acquisitions. In addition, this study helps to develop a dyadic perspective on acquisitions by giving equal attention to the viewpoints and actions of selling firms (Graebner, 2004; Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004 ), a group largely neglected by prior research.
METHODS
This study grew out of a broader research endeavor examining acquisition processes and decision making from the viewpoints of both buyers and sellers. Trust was not a concept that was identified a priori as being of interest but one that emerged from the data as an important influence on acquisition decision making. A subsequent review of the interorganizational trust literature revealed very little previous work on trust in acquisitions, suggesting the need to extend theory in this area.
The general approach of this study is "theory elaboration" (Lee, Mitchell, & Sablynski, 1999) . Drawing upon prior research, I define trust as a positive expectation regarding the conduct of another party in a situation involving risk or vulnerability (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998) . I adopt the perspective that trust is a multilevel concept (Currall & Inkpen, 2002) and define interorganizational trust as the "collectively-held orientation" of a group's individual members toward another group or firm (Zaheer et al., 1998: 143) . By this definition, groups and organizations as well as individuals can both trust and be trusted. Trust at the top management team level may be particularly critical in interorganizational transactions, since senior management is responsible for major strategic actions such as alliances and acquisitions (Schoorman et al., 2007; Zaheer, Lofstrom, & George, 2002) . Therefore, in this study, I focus specifically on trust between the top management teams of the buyer and seller engaged in an acquisition (or, if the buyer is a very large firm, the top management team of the relevant business unit).
The research design is a qualitative, multiplecase study (Eisenhardt, 1989) . Case studies are a preferred research strategy for examining complex social phenomena because they allow researchers to develop a holistic understanding of real-life events (Yin, 2003) and to elucidate dynamic processes involving multiple causal chains (Pettigrew, 1992) . In comparison to single-case, ethnographic studies, the multiple-case method trades off a degree of detail in favor of greater generalizability (Yin, 2003) .
Setting
The research setting was acquisitions of entrepreneurial, technology-based ventures. This setting offered several advantages. As stated previously, acquisitions of technology ventures have particular relevance for developing theory on trust in acqui-sitions. Trust may be especially pertinent in these transactions because technology-intensive firms are more able to choose their own buyers (Coff, 2003) and have access to dense industry networks that may supply useful information about potential partners (Powell, 1990) . In addition, privately held targets represent the majority of acquisition activity in the United States (Capron & Shen, 2007) , and acquisitions of entrepreneurial firms are the subject of substantial and growing research interest (e.g., Puranam et al., 2006; Schweizer, 2005) .
The current study focuses on the acquisition wave of 1999 -2000. Most merger and acquisition activity occurs in waves (e.g., Andrade & Stafford, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan, 2004) . These waves are often triggered by technological advancement or other industry shocks (Harford, 2005) , coincide with peak market valuations, and are followed by market declines (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, & Viswanathan, 2005) . Following this pattern, the 1999 -2000 acquisition wave was triggered by a significant technological advance (the growth of the Internet) and coincided with a "boom-bust" cycle in the financial markets.
Sample
The primary sample included 12 entrepreneurial firms and eight acquirers. Table 1 summarizes various characteristics of the firms in this sample. Three entrepreneurial firms were sampled in each of four industries: networking hardware, communications software, financial software, and online commerce. The sampled industries differed on key strategic dimensions such as cost structure, customer profile, and method of sales and distribution. In each industry, two of the entrepreneurial firms were acquired (for a total of eight acquisitions), and the remaining firm received interest from buyers but remained independent. The eight completed acquisitions provided a dyadic view of the entire acquisition process. However, to understand if trust influences whether an acquisition occurs at all, it was also useful to examine deals that were considered but never realized. I therefore gathered data on deals that any of the eight buyers and 12 potential targets considered but did not complete.
Entrepreneurial activity is spatially concentrated (Schoonhoven & Romanelli, 2001; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001 ). Since regional clustering could influence the dynamics of trust in acquisitions, I sampled both target-acquirer pairs that were located in the same region and pairs that were located in regions distant from one another (e.g., a European firm acquiring a Silicon Valley start-up). The completed acquisitions included four target-acquirer pairs located in the same local region and four pairs located in distant regions. All acquisitions took place less than six months prior to data collection, improving the likelihood that informants accurately remembered events that had occurred (Huber & Power, 1985) . Six acquisitions were ongoing during data collection. This allowed incorporation of both real-time and retrospective data, a useful combination for understanding the sequence and flow of events (Pettigrew, 1992) . Retrospective data allow for efficiency in data collection, and real-time data improve depth of understanding of how events evolve over time (Leonard-Barton, 1990) .
The mean acquisition price in the sample was $175 million, which is very similar to the average acquisition price of $155 million for U.S. venturefunded companies in the study time period, according to the database VentureSource. All acquisitions involved the purchase of 100 percent of the targets' equity. The sampled acquisitions were paid for with the buyers' equity, as was typical during the study time period (Schultz & Zaman, 2001 ) and is typical during merger waves in general (RhodesKropf & Viswanathan, 2004) .
Agency theory suggests that the acquisition motives and preferences of a target firm's managers and its shareholders may differ (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . I therefore collected information about the ownership structure of the target firms. Of the eight companies that were acquired, management owned a controlling share in four, and investors owned a controlling share in four. Five acquired firms had received venture capital, and the remaining three were funded through other sources, such as self-financing and angel investment. I also collected information on acquired firm board composition. The mean number of directors was 5.1; 32 percent of the directors were active company managers; 44 percent, investors; and 24 percent, outsiders. This breakdown was similar to the board composition reported in other studies of entrepreneurial firms (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2003; Lerner, 1995) .
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The buyers in the sample were more diverse and included both young entrepreneurial firms and established multinational corporations. There were six publicly traded and two privately held buyers. The average number of employees among buyers 1 Lerner (1995) reported an average of 5.0 directors in his sample (including 27 percent active managers, 46 percent investors, and 25 percent outsiders), and Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) reported an average of 6.0 directors (35 percent active managers, 41 percent investors, 23 percent outsiders). (Zollo & Singh, 2004) , I collected data on buyers' acquisition experience. I gathered information on whether a firm as a whole had conducted prior acquisitions, as well as whether individual members of the firm's top management team or board of directors had acquisition experience. Three of the eight buyers had acquisition experience at the firm level and had developed dedicated M&A staff. Of the remaining five buyers, three had acquisition experience among both the top management team and the board of directors. The remaining two buyers had acquisition experience within the board of directors only. For completeness, I gathered the same experience information for sellers. Although no seller had acquisition experience at the firm level, 10 of the 12 sellers had acquisition experience within their top management team, board of directors, or both.
Data Collection
I used several data sources: (1) quantitative and qualitative data from semistructured interviews with key acquisition participants from both selling and buying firms, (2) e-mails and phone calls to clarify interviews and track real-time processes, and (3) archival data, including company websites, business publications, and regulatory filings. I conducted more than 80 interviews. The first phase included 15 pilot interviews with managers who had sold their companies, managers who had purchased companies, investors in companies that were sold, and acquisition intermediaries. The pilot interviews indicated that sellers' acquisition decisions were usually made by a small set of people, typically the chief executive officer and two or three key executives and/or board members. Buyers' decision processes involved somewhat broader participation, but decisions were ultimately made by the top management team of the firm or, if the buyer was very large, the top management team of a "Years" refers to time since founding. "Control" (manager vs. investor) refers to ownership majority (50 percent or more of the firm's equity). "TMT" is "top management team." b "Experience" refers to prior acquisition experience by firm, top management team members, and/or members of board of directors. c In the cases of Model and Regimen, buyer profiles appear for Armor and Karma because these potential buyers were interviewed, although the acquisitions were not completed.
d Spur and Prime were both acquired by Checkmate, in a combined deal.
the relevant business unit. Other individuals at both firms had limited awareness of the events taking place until late in the acquisition process. In the primary data collection, I interviewed multiple senior-level informants from each firm. (See Table 1 for a list of the positions of these interviewees.) Use of multiple informants mitigates subject biases (Golden, 1992; Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997 ) and leads to a richer, more elaborated model (Schwenk, 1985) . The pilot interviews guided my identification of the informants who were the most influential in each acquisition process. To further ensure that the sample included the most important individuals, I used snowball sampling. My initial entry was typically made through either the CEO of the selling firm or the head of business development at the buying firm. Each informant then named other individuals who had been actively involved in the acquisition within both the buyer and seller. Selling firm informants typically included the CEO and senior vice presidents (VPs), as well as one or more investors who were board members and/or had led a funding round. Buying firm informants typically included the CEO or business unit head, the vice president of business development, and one or more other senior managers or board members who were involved with the acquisition.
The interviews were 60 to 90 minutes in length. Interviews began with background information and then asked the informant for an open-ended chronology of the company's acquisition-related activities and decisions. Open-ended questioning leads to higher accuracy in retrospective reports (Lipton, 1977; Miller et al., 1997) . Examples of questions include, "When did you first begin thinking about acquisition?" "What alternatives to acquisition did you consider?" "What potential buyers/targets did you consider, and what kind of interaction did you have with them?" "Could you describe the negotiation process?" and "What happened after the acquisition closed?" No questions specifically mentioned trust, deception, or related issues. However, these topics emerged unprompted in informants' discussions of the pros and cons of various potential partners and their descriptions of negotiation processes. Each interview concluded with several closed-ended questions about the firm, including its founding date and number of employees. In addition to the buyers and sellers, I interviewed several individuals who had extensive acquisition experience, such as the head of technology mergers at a prominent investment bank. These interviews included questions that were idiosyncratic to the expertise of the informant.
All interviews were audiotaped and transcribed. The transcriptions totaled 1,260 double-spaced pages. I asked follow-up questions via phone or e-mail when clarification was required. If acquisition events were ongoing, I conducted subsequent interviews when a major event occurred, such as closure of the deal or the departure of an acquired executive. This procedure allowed me to capture events and viewpoints as they emerged. I interviewed informants as many as three times.
Throughout data collection, I took steps to minimize informant biases. First, as noted above, the sample comprised cases in which the events of interest had occurred no more than six months prior to data collection. Prior research has suggested that informant recollections are stable over periods of this length (Huber, 1985) . Second, the sample included real-time as well as retrospective cases. During the analysis phase, I compared the real-time and retrospective cases and confirmed that no differences were present. Third, the informants included multiple individuals from each selling and buying firm. Such individuals are likely to have different perspectives on and interests in the acquisition process. If retrospective (or other) bias were an issue, I would have seen significant differences in their event descriptions (Seidler, 1974) . I did not. Fourth, I took care to interview individuals at the center of the acquisition process. Highly influential and knowledgeable informants are the most reliable, particularly when they are recalling important, recent events (Huber & Power, 1985; Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993; Seidler, 1974) . Fifth, I promised confidentiality to encourage candor (Glick, Huber, Miller, Doty, & Sutcliffe, 1990; Huber & Power, 1985; Miller et al., 1997) . Finally, I addressed potential subject bias by employing multiple data sources (Jick, 1979) . I compared informants' responses not only with those of other informants, but also with archival data (from sources such as acquisition announcements and regulatory filings) where appropriate.
Data Analysis
Data analysis was partly planned and partly emergent. Throughout the analysis, I shifted back and forth between the raw data, the patterns emerging from the data, and extant theory on trust in interorganizational transactions. The analysis took an iterative rather than a linear path but for simplicity is presented here in distinct stages.
Stage 1. Because the purpose of this study was to examine the role of trust throughout the acquisition process, a first analytical step was to understand and organize key acquisition events. I began by writing detailed case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989) . The case studies were 40 to 70 pages in length and included informant quotes as well as tables and timelines summarizing the key facts of each acquisition. A second researcher also examined the raw data and formed an independent perspective, which was incorporated into each case.
I used a temporal bracketing strategy to distill a process model from the cases (Denis, Lamothe, & Langley, 2001; Langley, 1999) . This strategy involves identifying discrete time periods, or phases, within a process. In this study, phases were demarcated by changes in the individuals involved, the nature of the activities taking place, and the physical location of these activities. Five acquisition phases emerged from this analysis. The first phase is screening, in which CEOs and business development officers initially evaluate both potential partners and potential partnership structures (i.e., acquisition versus alliance). The second phase is socializing, in which the CEOs or business unit heads of the two firms informally interact in nonwork settings. The third phase, which may overlap with socializing, is agreeing in principle. In this phase, the top managers' discussions shift from personal topics to drafting the outlines of the acquisition agreement. The fourth phase is legalization, in which managers work with attorneys and financial advisors to create formal, legally binding acquisition documents. This phase concluded with the official closing of a deal. The last phase is implementation, in which managers from the two firms begin integrating the businesses.
Stage 2. The second stage of analysis was aimed at understanding how informants described and conceptualized trust in the context of acquisitions. Prior research has used many different dimensionalizations and measures of trust (e.g., Cummings & Bromiley, 1996; Currall & Judge, 1995; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) . Because none of these measures has emerged as dominant (McEvily & Tortoriello, 2007) , and because many were uniquely tailored to their original settings, I initially cast a broad net. I examined each interview transcript in detail, using existing interorganizational trust research in a "sensitizing" role (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) . The trust literature drew my attention to comments regarding trust, vulnerability, integrity, deception, commitment fulfillment, reliability, and other related concepts. In this process, I discovered a correspondence between informants' comments and the trust dimensions developed and validated by Cummings and Bromiley, who described trust as "an individual's belief or common belief among a group of individuals that another individual or group (a) makes good-faith efforts to behave in accordance with any commitments both explicit and implicit, (b) is honest in whatever negotiations preceded such commitments, and (c) does not take excessive advantage of another even when the opportunity is available " (1996: 303) .
In the present context, evidence of trust on Cummings and Bromiley's (1996) "a," "b," and "c" dimensions (described above) included the following examples: (a) "We totally trusted them. We liked how they did business-they do what they say they are going to do"; (b) "When we got into the details of the deal [during negotiations] . . . [the CFO] . . . was just unbelievable to us. He was a straight shot"; and (c) "You can trust them. . . . If we thought [buyer's management] were out to get us and wanted to drive us to the bone and sweat us out and were out to screw us over, I wouldn't have done the deal." Evidence of distrust on these dimensions included comments such as: (a) "There's never a sure thing.
[The deal] is not done until it's signed and delivered," (b) "During the courtship, everyone puts their best foot forward. Then you find out later," and (c) "You get the feeling that they are going to take you for a ride, chip away at your value-and that leaves you exposed." As in Cummings and Bromiley (1996) , the three dimensions were closely related; in no case did leaders from a firm express trust toward a given counterpart on one dimension and distrust toward the same counterpart on any other dimension.
Stage 3. In the final stage of analysis, I integrated the findings from the preceding stages to understand how the presence or absence of trust influenced the unfolding of the acquisition process, and vice versa. The process model developed in stage 1 served as an analytical guide. I examined each of the phases, noting how buyers' and sellers' beliefs concerning trust and trustworthiness both emerged from and affected the activities taking place. I used standard cross-case analysis techniques (Eisenhardt, 1989) to look for patterns and revisited the data often, using charts and tables to facilitate comparisons between cases (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Yin, 2003) .
FINDINGS Trust Asymmetries and the Acquisition Process
In this section, I address how buyers' and sellers' trust-related views both emerge from and influence events throughout the phases of the acquisition process. I find asymmetries between buyers and sellers regarding whether trust is important in the transaction and find both asymmetries and errors in firms' assessments of whether their counterparts are trustworthy and trusting. In the screening phase, sellers eliminate distrusted partners, but buyers do not. This creates a fundamental asymmetry in which most sellers trust their buyers, but most buyers distrust their sellers. During the next two phases of the acquisition process, socializing and agreeing in principle, trust asymmetries grow and deception is common, particularly among buyers. Deception ranges from negotiation-related bluffing to more serious, material deception. The occurrence and form of deception are related to whether the deceiver trusts and feels trusted by the other party. However, beliefs about whether the other party is trustworthy and/or trusting are often inaccurate. In the legalization phase, asymmetric views of one another's trustworthiness lead most buyers, but few sellers, to engage in extensive due diligence and to implement protective deal terms. During postdeal implementation, deception may be revealed and trust damaged. I explore why buyers are willing to behave deceptively, despite potential risks to postdeal cooperation and industry reputation. Finally, I outline the complex relationships between trust asymmetries, trust errors, and acquisition behavior and explore implications for developing a broader theory of trust asymmetry in interorganizational transactions.
Screening: Emergence of Trust Asymmetries
For both buyers and sellers, the acquisition process began with the decision to pursue some form of partnership with another firm. Firm leaders viewed partnerships as opportunities to obtain technologies, products, and expertise more quickly than they could be developed internally. As a business development executive at Checkmate commented, "It is all about timing. It is like a race in this market." Having decided to seek a partnership, firm leaders faced two intertwined, and often simultaneous, sets of decisions: choosing the best form of partnership, and choosing the best partner.
Forms of partnership. Although partnerships can take many forms, leaders of both buyers and sellers focused their initial decision making on the broad choices of acquisition or alliance. Prior work has proposed several theoretical explanations for firms' decisions to acquire rather than ally (for reviews, see Schilling and Steensma [2002] , Villalonga and McGahan [2005] , and Wang and Zajac [2007] ), and these theories have differing implications for the role of trust in acquisitions. One explanation draws upon transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975 (Williamson, , 1985 , focusing on a firm's need to minimize opportunistic behavior by transaction partners. If concerns over opportunism are relatively low, alliance is considered more efficient than acquisition (Alston & Gillespie, 1989; Schilling & Steensma, 2002) . However, alliances may enable partners to misappropriate knowledge (Steensma & Corley, 2000) , particularly in technology-intensive industries (Villalonga & McGahan, 2005) . In addition, alliances often require renegotiation at a later date, subjecting a firm to "smallnumbers bargaining" and possible exploitation by its partner (Pisano, 1990) . Acquisition avoids both problems, since it provides the acquirer with the ability to monitor and control the acquired organization and to redirect its activities without engaging in renegotiation. Therefore, if the risk of opportunism is high, transaction cost arguments favor acquisition over alliance.
A second explanation for the choice between alliances and acquisitions draws from real options theory (Folta & Miller, 2002; McGrath, 2000) . Alliances may offer firms greater flexibility since they are easier to reverse than acquisitions, yet still offer the larger firm the option of later acquiring the target (Kogut, 1991) . Such flexibility is particularly important if there is uncertainty regarding whether a technology will work or will have commercial success (Steensma & Corley, 2001) .
A third theoretical explanation for firms' choice between acquisition and alliance draws on the resource-based (Wernerfelt, 1984) and knowledgebased (Grant, 1996) views of the firm. These perspectives focus on creating sustainable competitive advantage and suggest that acquisitions offer two advantages over alliances. First, the hierarchical control resulting from an acquisition may promote faster and more effective coordination of knowledge-based resources across multiple individuals (Conner & Prahalad, 1996) . Second, acquisition provides the buyer with exclusive access to the target's technology and expertise, providing the buyer with a resource that is unique and difficult to imitate (Kale & Puranam, 2004) . In contrast, even an exclusive alliance leaves open the possibility that a partner could eventually be acquired by a competitor of the larger firm.
To the extent that acquisitions are motivated by transaction cost concerns, we might expect buyers to be likely to distrust their targets. In contrast, real options and resource-based explanations for acquisition versus alliance decisions have no clear implications for whether trust would or would not be present in an acquisition (Conner & Prahalad, 1996) . In the current study, both transaction cost and real options explanations received some limited support. Harbor's leaders expressed a transaction cost logic for choosing between alliance and acquisition, while Picasso's leaders expressed a real options logic, indicating that alliances and minority investments were useful for exploring uncer- 
Karma
Closer coordination "Our first attempt was to sign partnerships with all these guys. . . . What we started to realize was that because our customers were purchasers of software, the natural thing was to have a combined system. . . . We started looking at the marketplace to see if there is a company we could acquire." (CEO)
Concept Closer coordination
Combining the firms ensured that the products would be integrated and compatible. This was desirable because customers typically needed both products: "Every time we sold a copy of our software, we had to sell a copy of theirs, or something like it." (VP, business development)
Continued
tain technologies without the commitment of an acquisition. No other firms mentioned either transaction cost or real options rationales for choosing acquisition rather than alliance. Table 2 summarizes the rationales for the studied acquisitions. As in other research on technology acquisitions during this time period (Uhlenbruck, Hitt, & Semadeni, 2006) , resource-and knowledge-based perspectives played a more prominent role in acquirers' decisions. The desire to keep a target's skills and expertise out of the hands of competitors was a motivator for five of the eight acquirers. A vice president at Craze explained, "We've created a portfolio of the best companies. . . . We've acquired the best companies off the market, so no one else could." A need for closer coordination also motivated buyers to seek acquisition rather than alliance. A business development executive at Picasso reasoned, "This market was going to be strategic for us. We needed to have a full set of products in our portfolio. . . . You need to have the technology inhouse so that you can provide an end-to-end solution. You can't do that with a partner's product." Sellers also played an important role in the decision to engage in an acquisition rather than an alliance. Like buyers, sellers viewed acquisition as a means to achieve closer coordination and to ensure their partners did not combine with competitors instead. An executive at Isle explained, "Basically, whoever could get Harbor was going to be automatically the leader in the space. . . . So that was what drove our decision making." In addition, both buyers and sellers mentioned that acquisitions played a signaling role that could not be fulfilled by an alliance. Buyers viewed acquisitions as a signal to financial analysts that their firms were able to aggressively enter new markets. A board member at Ciao reasoned, "The market sees right through business development deals. . . . The acquisition of Goalie put a stake in the ground: we can acquire companies, we can integrate companies, we know how to think about synergistic businesses." Sellers viewed merging with a larger firm as signaling scale and credibility to potential customers in a way that alliances could not.
In sum, these acquisitions were primarily motivated by resource-based and signaling concerns, and only secondarily by transaction cost logic. Thus, the decision to participate in an acquisition versus an alliance was not in itself an indication of distrust. Nonetheless, as discussed below, clear patterns of trust and distrust began to emerge as buyers and sellers evaluated the pros and cons of specific partners.
Choice of partners. In tandem with deciding whether acquisition or alliance was more attractive, firm leaders evaluated specific partners. Both buyers and sellers often considered many possible partners. A leader at a seller, Concept, recalled, "We had a list of people we thought would be good candidates to get acquired by. . . . Somebody knows somebody, that sort of thing." Both buyers and sellers narrowed their lists of potential partners on the basis of strategic fit, including such characteristics as product line complementarity and technology platform similarity. For sellers, however, trustworthiness was also an important criterion for screening partners. Potential buyers were favored if they were perceived as trustworthy and were eliminated if perceived as not trustworthy. Table 3A summarizes the role of trust in sellers' screening of buyers. Sellers based their judgments of trustworthiness on prior direct relationships, including friendships and business partnerships; shared third-party ties; industry reputation; and impressions formed during initial partnership-related conversations.
For example, Monet's leaders favored one buyer, Picasso, because of its industry reputation for trustworthiness. According to Monet's chief financial officer, "Screwing companies is not Picasso's reputation." Conversely, Monet's leaders refused to consider acquisition by a potential buyer that they did not trust, as Monet's CEO explained:
We have the same board chairman as they do, but we didn't like their CEO. He's dishonest. He tries to negotiate deals with employees behind the backs of investors. He is just not somebody our management team wanted to do business with.
Monet was not unusual. Eleven of the 12 sellers, including both management-controlled and investor-controlled firms, indicated that trust was a significant criterion for screening buyers. If a seller distrusted a buyer, talks ended quickly. Sellers who distrusted all of the buyers approaching them simply rejected all offers and remained independent. The CEO of Evergreen explained why she rebuffed all of her company's potential suitors thus: "We were really suspicious of them. We trusted them zip."
Buyers did not demonstrate a reciprocal concern for the trustworthiness of sellers, however. Table  3B summarizes the role of trust in buyers' screening of sellers. Although buyers were not acquiring targets because of distrust per se, lack of trust was not viewed as a reason to eliminate a target, either. Six of the eight buyers expressed distrust in their eventual targets. Buyers suspected these sellers of hiding their motives, exaggerating the state of their technology development, and secretly negotiating with other parties. Typical buyer comments included: "This all seemed like 'vaporware,'" "They showed a demo, but demos are always smoke and mirrors," and "They were playing us." Nonetheless, buyers were willing to acquire these targets.
Why might buyers and sellers assess the importance of trust in acquisitions so differently? One potential explanation is that buyers chose to acquire precisely because they distrusted the target. However, as noted earlier, fear of opportunism was not the primary motivator for these acquisitions. A second explanation is that sellers were younger, less experienced firms, and perhaps were more naïve than buyers about acquisitions. These distinctions likely had an impact, but the data suggest disparities in experience cannot be the entire explanation. First, both seasoned (e.g., Picasso) and novice (e.g., Harbor) acquirers were willing to negotiate with distrusted targets. Moreover, although no selling firm had previously been acquired, many individual selling firm leaders had experience with acquisitions at other firms. Yet both more-and lessexperienced selling firm leaders valued trustworthiness in their buyers.
A final explanation arises from considering the roles that buyers and sellers have in the acquisition process, the risks that are involved, and the shift in power that occurs after deals close. In the course of an acquisition, sellers lose power while buyers gain power. This asymmetry is an inherent feature of acquisitions, regardless of the motivation for a deal or the experience levels of either buyer or seller. This shift in power seems to have engendered buyers' and sellers' disparate views of the importance of trustworthiness. Power, risk, and the importance of trust. The buyers and sellers in this study began the acquisition process with approximately equal bargaining power. As one buyer noted, "Quite honestly, they needed us as much as we needed them." Powerdependence theory (Emerson, 1972a (Emerson, , 1972b suggests that actors have power in an exchange if they have viable alternatives-that is, if their desired resource is available from more than one potential partner. Both buyers and sellers had alternatives to acquisition, allowing them to walk away from unattractive deals. Sellers typically had multiple would-be suitors as well as investors willing to further fund them as independent firms, and buyers had multiple would-be targets offering roughly comparable technologies. A vice president at Ciao noted this: "There are two companies a week that want to be acquired by us. It's just overwhelming." Rejected acquisition
Yet after the deal closed, a buyer's and seller's relative power would be very different. The buyer typically dominates key managerial positions as well as the board of directors of the combined firm (Harford, 2003; Hartzell, Ofek, & Yermack, 2004; Wulf, 2004) . Given their prospects of heightened power, buyers viewed sellers' trustworthiness as nonessential. A leader of Craze explained that if he did not trust a seller, Craze would simply plan more intensive postdeal intervention:
If we are to acquire this, we need to come in immediately with an integration team, pour effort into beefing this up and making it work. . . . If the motivation is there from a revenue and market perspective, the outlook is pretty much, "You have to make it work, no matter what." We could have swooped in right away and "Oh my God, this is going to be hard" and fixed it.
Sellers, however, lose power after acquisitions close. Sellers face the risk that buyers will impose unwelcome practices and strategies on acquired firms (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986) , replace acquired managers, change leadership succession plans (Hartzell et al., 2004) , or even close acquired firms entirely (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009 ). If a buyer had deceived them during negotiations, the seller's top management team and employees would suffer. A vice president at Trend commented on the sense of obligation she felt toward her employees: "You feel an incredible amount of responsibility for helping these employees. . . . My biggest concern was that they not be disregarded, that they be given good positions." Similarly, the CEO of Model remarked:
When I think of [employee], I think, "He deserves the best possible place to work that the world can possibly give him, because he's that kind of person." I feel that tremendous debt of gratitude for the employees. . . . I'm looking for a company that values people as well as results.
Although these arguments help explain managers' preferences for trustworthy buyers, an intriguing question is why sellers' investors would support such preferences. Agency theory suggests that although selling firm executives might prefer a trustworthy buyer for the sake of themselves or their employees, investors would be concerned only with obtaining the highest price (Jensen & Ruback, 1983) .
2 However, in this sample, both manager-controlled (e.g., Rocket, Isle, Goalie, Spur) and investor-controlled (e.g., Monet, Trend, Concept, Junket) firms screened buyers on the basis of trust. Investors in these ventures believed that only senior management could decide whether and to whom to sell a company. A venture capitalist and board member in Junket, an investor-controlled firm, commented: "This is a personal philosophy issue. I will not make any decisions for management. They have to make that call." One reason that venture capitalists did not want to force the hands of managers was concern about access to future investment opportunities. Venture capitalists compete for access to attractive investments, and a negative reputation among entrepreneurs could be a competitive liability. A venture capital investor in Evergreen explained, "As a venture investor, your reputation is part of what makes you successful, and entrepreneurs, if you do wrong by them, they are not going to come back to work with you."
A final question is why buyers so often distrusted their sellers. Assuming that concerns over opportunism were not the primary reason for acquiring, there is no a priori reason why buyers would be more likely to acquire distrusted versus trusted companies. The explanation seems to be twofold. First, buyers (and sellers) had a generalized distrust of most potential partners. The firms were engaged in rapidly changing and intensely competitive markets. As technologies developed, adjacent markets and products converged, and partners who began in slightly different sectors could quickly become competitors. Experimental evidence suggests that as conflict becomes more salient, exchange partners are less likely to be viewed as trustworthy (Molm, Peterson, & Takahashi, 2003) . Similarly, competitive industry dynamics seemed to foster a "predator or prey" mind-set that encouraged wariness of outside firms. Second, selling firms were generally younger and smaller than buyers. As a result, buyers were somewhat more likely than targets to feel that they lacked sufficient knowledge to trust their counterparts (cf. Kotha, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam, 2004) . One buyer commented about a target thus: "We tried to dig out information on them. . . . But the best we could find was they were working at an apartment on Sand Hill Road."
Socializing: Trust Asymmetries and Conflicting Interpretations
Once a buyer and seller had identified acquisition as an attractive means of partnering and identified one another as attractive partners, the next phase was typically socializing between the leaders of the two firms. In six of the eight completed acquisitions, buyer and seller leaders met informally in nonoffice settings, including restaurants, coffeehouses, a CEO's home, and even a vacation retreat. Though acquisition was on the minds of both buyer and seller, the conversation topics were much more personal, including college memories, hobbies, and life philosophies.
Buyers and sellers had distinct and often con- flicting interpretations of these social interactions. Sellers viewed socializing through the lens of trust formation, and they perceived social interaction as building deeper relationships through honest exchange of information. Buyers viewed the same events through the lens of bargaining and saw social interaction as a way to gain influence over sellers. As a result, the disparity between buyers' and sellers' views of one another's trustworthiness grew. At the same time, socializing influenced both parties' emerging beliefs regarding whether they were trusted by their counterparts. Firm leaders' views of whether their counterparts were trusting, as well as trustworthy, played an important role in shaping subsequent behavior, particularly deceit. Table 4 presents case information and exemplary quotations about socializing and its interpretation. Deepening of sellers' trust. For sellers, socializing was an opportunity to deepen trust by developing sincere personal relationships with buyers. For buyers, informal interaction was an opportunity to gain bargaining leverage by gathering information, engaging in ingratiation, and isolating sellers from their legal and financial advisors. Trend and its buyer, Armor, offer an example. Early in the two firms' acquisition talks, Armor's CEO invited Trend's CEO to his home for an evening. An Armor vice president observed that the conversation strayed from acquisition: "[The CEOs] just shot the s-. We didn't talk much about the company." On the basis of this personal interaction, Trend's leaders trusted Armor sufficiently to refuse an attractive offer from a competing bidder, even before receiving a formal written offer from Armor's board. Armor's leaders, however, viewed socializing with Trend's CEO as a negotiating tactic intended to prevent Trend from accepting an acquisition offer from Armor's biggest competitor. Armor's vice president of business development explained:
We tripped over the fact that one of our competitors was actually in the midst of attempting to do an acquisition of them. I called our CEO and said, "Get your butt down here! This company is off the charts compared to everything else we've looked at. We can't let this happen." What our CEO did, which is what he does so well, is he sat down with [Trend's CEO] personally. They spent the afternoon together. And then he asked [Trend's CEO] to come over later that evening and sit down and talk with him. We spent the rest of the evening talking about things other than the acquisition. We talked about his aspirations, our aspirations. I think [Trend's CEO] very much enjoyed the conversation.
The vice president regarded this socializing, or "bear hugging," as an excellent persuasion tool:
It stood out as a very good move that we made. We "bear-hugged" them at just the right moment. Those two days that we spent with their people were very effective. Slowly but surely, the management began realizing they didn't want to work for the other buyer.
Fortunately for Trend's leaders, Armor's statements to Trend during the socializing process were essentially accurate. This was not true for other buyers. Most buyers neither expected sellers to be trustworthy during social interactions, nor felt obligated to be trustworthy themselves. An illustration of this pattern is the case of Rocket and North. Rocket was in the process of raising a round of venture capital financing when approached by North about a potential partnership, possibly including an acquisition. Rocket's CEO and North's business unit head began a series of informal meetings at a nearby coffeehouse. Rocket's CEO viewed these talks as an honest exchange of information that built a personal relationship and reinforced his trust in North. He recalled:
We met off and on from January to July. It was a good time for us both to learn. We were pretty open, too. We got to trust them that way. We told them we were on an IPO track and talking with venture capitalists. Openness is the best policy.
North's representative felt quite differently about the meetings, saying, "We were just fishing information from them." He explained that he viewed the coffeehouse sessions as a way to improve North's bargaining position by convincing Rocket not to take additional venture capital investment, which would have increased Rocket's valuation. As a stalling tactic, he intentionally misled Rocket's CEO by suggesting that North would be willing to provide capital to Rocket as an independent firm:
That was a tricky time.
[Rocket] had some [venture capital] term sheets on the table. The company would have been more expensive after VCs got in. North pretended [we were] interested in throwing in $5 to $10 million for a VC round. That was the official story. I think my role and actions were to keep friendly conversation open and daily contact. I was making sure they didn't sign the VC stuff. I sat with [Rocket CEO] in the Starbucks cafe having conversations about life and the universe and everything. It was this endless discussion.
North's representative concluded that the informal conversations had "worked really well" in persuading Rocket to decline financing and pursue acquisition.
Perceptions of counterpart's trust. In addition to asymmetrically deepening sellers' trust in their Continued buyers, socializing provided an opportunity for both buyers and sellers to develop beliefs regarding whether they were trusted by their counterparts. Surprisingly, these assessments were often wrong. Table 5 contrasts the actual and perceived trust of both parties. Five sellers (Monet, Rocket, Concept, Goalie, and Prime) misread whether their buyers trusted them. Four of these five sellers believed they were trusted by buyers, when the opposite was true. Two buyers (North and Karma) also made errors. In both cases, buyers mistakenly believed that sellers did not trust them. In the case of Rocket and North, both buyer and seller were mistaken. Their informal interaction at the coffeehouse left Rocket's CEO feeling that North's leader was demonstrating his trust in Rocket by being very forthcoming. Rocket's CEO commented that North's leader "probably told us more than he should about their business strategy and how we fit in." In fact, North's representative distrusted Rocket's CEO, commenting, "We had to be careful . . . it was worrying that we didn't know what he was after." For his part, North's leader erroneously believed that Rocket's CEO viewed him with skepticism and knew that he was not being entirely honest. Although North pretended to be interested in providing venture capital rather than acquiring Rocket, North's leader believed that Rocket's CEO was savvy enough to know better: "I don't believe that he was naïve enough [to think] nothing was going on."
Whether correct or not, leaders' views of the other firm's trust, as well as its trustworthiness, influenced leaders' behavior in important ways. Specifically, leaders' views of whether their counterparts were trustworthy and/or trusting shaped decisions regarding whether to behave deceptively. This influence became particularly apparent during the next phase of the acquisition process.
Agreeing in Principle: Trust, Distrust, and Deception
Agreeing in principle, which often followed quickly after socializing, involved signing a non- outlining the proposed deal. Signing a letter of intent could be a risky matter, particularly for sellers. Term sheets typically include a legally binding "no-shop" clause that requires the two firms to negotiate exclusively until either the deal closes or a specified time period expires. If the acquisition fails to come to fruition, both buyer and seller could lose valuable time in their searches for suitable partners. For sellers, an even more critical issue was delays in raising additional capital. Sellers often put fundraising plans on hold during acquisition talks, which put their solvency at risk if the buyer withdrew from the deal. However, because most sellers trusted their buyers, they viewed an agreement in principle as tantamount to a completed deal. Sellers expected that once a letter of intent had been signed, the remaining details were formalities. A Goalie founder explained that he had no doubt that Ciao would fulfill its promise to complete the acquisition: "Even though we [still] had to talk to the lawyers a lot, we basically had agreed to compromise on all the issues. If you can trust them, you feel like they're good people, and all of the small little details will be worked out."
Buyers approached the letter of intent differently, as a means of gathering additional information before making a final decision about the deal. As an executive from North commented, "Our ambition with the term sheet is basically to get in and do some due diligence, to make sure the technical side is working." Moreover, many buyers behaved deceptively during this phase. Deception took two forms: negotiation-related deception, or "bluffing," and a more serious form of misrepresentation, which will be termed material deception.
4 Both forms were related to the deceiver's beliefs concerning whether the opposite party was trustworthy and/or trusting. Table 6A summarizes information on buyers' trust and perceived trust and offers illustrative evidence on buyers' deception, and Table 6B presents similar information for sellers.
Negotiation-related deception. Negotiation-related deception involved providing misleading information about the presence of alternative targets or buyers, the prices of competing offers, and deadlines for making decisions. Negotiation-related deception was common, with seven of the eight buyers and three of the eight sellers exhibiting this behavior (Tables 6A and 6B ). Both young firms (e.g., Concept and Karma) and large, experienced firms (e.g., Picasso and North) engaged in negotiation-related deception.
An example is the buyer Harbor. Harbor intentionally misled Isle's leaders about how much Harbor was willing to pay for the company. A Harbor executive recalled, "We started out at a pretty low number, and we negotiated pretty hard to keep it low . . . they certainly had a lot more room to go. Which, to this day, they're not aware of. They were at a pretty big disadvantage." A second example is the seller Craze, which manipulated buyers' views regarding the presence of competing bidders. A Craze board member explained that the negotiation involved "A lot of 'Kabuki theater.' I mean, a lot of effort was made to make the buyers believe that certain companies were part of the auction process."
One reason that negotiation-related deception was so common is that bluffing was viewed as a widespread practice in bargaining situations. In the words of one informant, acquisition talks are "like a poker game." This view is consistent with statements in the negotiation literature that bluffing is "an accepted part of the negotiation process" (Schweitzer, 2005: 3) . Because negotiation-related deception was viewed as so commonplace, only in a narrow set of circumstances would firm leaders not engage in this behavior. As Tables 6A and 6B indicate, only when firm leaders both trusted and felt trusted by their counterparts did they refrain from negotiation-related bluffing. Figures 1A and 1B demonstrate this pattern graphically.
The combination of trusting and feeling trusted by the opposite firm seemed to trigger a logic of cooperation, partnership, and fairness that discouraged any deception, even negotiation-related bluffing. Armor, the lone buyer to not engage in any deception, both trusted and felt trusted by its target. Armor's CEO explained how these views shaped the negotiation process: "We just sat down and ballparked a number. We didn't try to play hardball and we tried to be generous. The term sheet was very simple." Sellers generally followed the same pattern as buyers, refraining from negotiation-related deception if (and only if) they both trusted and felt trusted by their counterparts. However, because sellers were more likely to hold these specific beliefs, the frequency of negotiation-related deception among sellers was lower than the frequency among buyers. The CEO of Prime, one of the five sellers that did not engage in negotiationrelated deception, reported: I kind of look at both sides of the equation and go for the point of fairness early. . . . We both went to something that was fair and stuck there. . . . You have to work out deals in this world where buyer and seller both feel like they have a fair deal because you are partners the next day. . . . I went early to fair instead of always trying to get the best deal. Material deception. Some firms also engaged in a second form of misrepresentation, which I term "material deception." Material deception pertained to topics that went beyond bluffing about prices or competing offers. For buyers, material deception involved misleading the seller about postintegration plans such as layoffs, relocation of personnel, changes in strategic direction, or diminished roles for senior managers. For sellers, material deception involved misleading the buyer about the status of the seller's product development efforts, the intentions of key personnel to remain with the firm, or other issues related to the buyer's future ability to realize value from the acquisition.
Material deception was viewed as a more serious matter than negotiation-related bluffing. The same informant who compared negotiation to a poker game felt material deception was unacceptable, arguing:
You have to be very candid in these discussions about what your objectives are. You can't make things up, "I intend to stay for the next two years, and I'll stick around," knowing that I'll pull the plug one month later. I think not being honest about things is a mistake.
As Tables 6A and 6B believing that Goalie was not trustworthy provided a rationale for justifying this behavior. Psychological research suggests that a fear of exploitation provides a moral justification for deception based on self-defense (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Steinel & De Dreu, 2004) . Similarly, Ciao's board member explained his negotiating tactics as self-protection: "Here's the way we thought about it: we tried to limit our downside . . . so we played a bit of the tough guy." Facing the combined forces of temptation and fear, Ciao leaders engaged in material deception toward Goalie. Goalie's founders were insistent that none of their employees be terminated as a result of the acquisition and that their company not be relocated. Ciao leaders assured them this would not happen, despite secretly intending to lay off the majority of Goalie's personnel and move the company to California. A Ciao board member recalled:
We only need five of their employees, [but] we didn't go and tell them, "Hey, what we're going to do is go out and fire ten people." We specifically said, "You can keep the business as-is, running in New York, through April." So we're buying ourselves some time. And then on April 15, we say, "Here's who has to move."
Because they trusted Ciao, Goalie's leaders took Ciao's representations at face value. Goalie's CEO affirmed that relocating was "the one thing that was nonnegotiable about the deal," and another Goalie executive said, "There's literally no overlap-no one who's going to get fired. No layoffs." Two other buyers, Harbor and Checkmate, also distrusted their targets but felt trusted by them. Like Ciao, both Harbor and Checkmate engaged in material deception. However, as indicated by Figure 2b , no seller fell into the category of distrusting but feeling trusted by the buyer, and no seller engaged in material deception. It is worth nothing that material deception by sellers was not impossible. Craze leaders related the story of a previous acquisition in which the seller had provided misleading information about headcount in a critical area. That acquisition differed from the other cases in that the seller was engaging with Craze not by choice, but by necessity, because the seller's originally preferred buyer had just been acquired by another firm. As this example suggests, material deception by sellers was possible, but unlikely, because most sellers only engaged in conversations with buyers they trusted.
Seller trust and buyer deception. The frequency of deception by buyers raises the question of why sellers originally believed these buyers were trustworthy-and how they could so often be mistaken.
Prior research suggests that interfirm trust emerges gradually from a combination of direct experience, reputation, and third-party referrals (Gulati, 1995; Larson, 1992; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Sako & Helper, 1998; Uzzi, 1997) , which provide "timely, relevant information on the . . . reliability of potential partners" (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999 : 1446 . Similarly, sellers based their assessments of trustworthiness on direct experience from friendships and previous professional interactions, on a buyer's general industry reputation, and on shared ties with third parties such as investors and past employers. However, these sources did not seem to be reliable predictors of a buyer's behavior in an acquisition. One reason is that acquisition situations may trigger behavior that is not seen under other circumstances, such as personal friendship or even interfirm alliance. Prior interactions between buyer and seller are likely to differ greatly from an acquisition in risk and importance. Acquisitions involve high stakes, which can foster deception and other competitive behavior (Gneezy, 2005; Tenbrusel, 1998 ). An informant from one buyer observed that the acquisition context generated a marked change in his own firm's senior executives. When a deal was in jeopardy, the executives turned from "mild-mannered" and "chummy" to angry and calculating:
They were livid. It's interesting to sit in on a board meeting, because our CFO and chief legal guy are very mild-mannered, but they were really mad. And it's interesting to hear the CFO saying, "We really want to dominate the world." He's a really chummy sort of guy.
In several cases, buyers were experienced acquirers, providing sellers the opportunity to seek information about buyers' previous behavior in acquisition settings. Yet even this information was not necessarily predictive of buyers' actions in subsequent acquisitions. Acquisitions are heterogeneous events (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo & Singh, 2004) . As a leader from Craze explained, "Things change here all the time.
[Acquisitions] are not cookie-cutter." Buyers' circumstances and behavior could change in a variety of ways from one acquisition to the next. One serial acquirer even described making a conscious decision to become less honest in future deals. The CEO had tried in a previous acquisition to be very open and "show [the acquirees] what nice guys we were," but after experiencing disappointing results, had decided in future acquisitions to "be quite a bit more ruthless . . . go in with a fairly Machiavellian set of rules." Finally, the model developed here suggests that a buyer's actions may differ dramatically depending on whether the buyer views a specific seller as trustworthy and/or trusting. As a result, in one acquisition a buyer may be quite honest, but in the next, highly deceptive. All of these factors may make it difficult for sellers to accurately predict whether a buyer will behave deceptively in a specific acquisition.
Legalization: Trust Asymmetries and Precautions
The fourth phase of the acquisition process, legalization, refers to the period between signing an agreement in principle and officially closing the deal. The legalization period provides a final chance for both buyers and sellers to protect themselves against counterparts' dishonesty. During this period, both firms can take precautions, including checking references on the other party's leaders, validating information about the opposing firm's technology and strategic plans, and designing deal terms to defend against possible misrepresentations. Table 7 presents evidence about this stage for each case.
Buyers typically took advantage of the legalization phase, conducting extensive due diligence and developing deal terms such as escrow periods that protected the buyer if target leaders had behaved deceptively. An example is Craze. Like most buyers, Craze conducted careful due diligence on its target, reviewing important customer contracts, examining the quality of the seller's technology, and even probing relationships among employees. Craze's chief technology officer outlined this process:
As we go further in the diligence, then we may ask for some more detail. Sometimes you notice that a certain person doesn't want to work with this person, or they actually happen to mention that their business model won't survive beyond next year, so these tidbits of information. . . . [And] legal will ask about all their customer agreements and license agreements. We try to evaluate what components the software is built out of, the cost of those components going forward, and will this be expensive to continue to develop and deploy? You ask those questions in the initial overview, and then in the second level of the diligence, you actually drill down to seeing the contract, worldwide license, etc.
Seven of the eight buyers described both conducting due diligence and implementing deal terms to protect themselves against any misrepresentation by their targets.
It was possible for sellers to take similar precautions. For example, Trend's leaders described gathering financial analysts' reports to get outside assessments of Arbor's management team and hiring an investment bank to assess Arbor's financial prospects. Fastlane's CEO demanded a "sizeable break-up fee" to guarantee interim financing if Craze withdrew from the acquisition deal. Yet Trend and Fastlane were the only two of the eight sellers to take significant precautions during legalization. Four sellers did not describe taking any steps to safeguard against a buyer's possible dishonesty, and the remaining two sellers took only minimal steps, engaging in limited due diligence. For example, an officer at Monet commented, "I asked a few friends at other Picasso acquisitions, and they verified what we thought. But we didn't do any systematic checking." Moreover, none of the eight sellers used both due diligence and deal terms to protect themselves.
A partial explanation for these differences is that sellers were smaller firms with limited resources to expend investigating buyers. In addition, because they were privately held, sellers did not face the prospect of shareholder lawsuits if their due diligence were lacking. However, these factors do not appear to tell the whole story. Even in the two cases in which the buyers were privately held and relatively safe from shareholder lawsuits, the firms took far more precautions than sellers. Moreover, while sellers did not have unlimited resources, they did have the assistance of high-caliber attorneys and experienced investors, many of whom gave cautionary advice. Yet sellers often did not heed the advice that these counselors provided. For example, one of Monet's board members, a partner at a prestigious venture capital firm, was concerned that Picasso was behaving opportunistically toward Monet during negotiations. He advised Monet to hire an investment bank, to no avail: I tried to interject the help of getting a bank involved, but the company said no. "Let me handle it," said our CEO. The whole point of this game is that if you let time go by, you lose leverage. And Picasso doesn't let time go by. It is, "Strike this deal, strike this deal." We could've interrupted that if we'd done the right things, but there wasn't any inclination to.
Monet's leaders also disregarded legal advice suggesting they were vulnerable to Picasso. Monet's chief financial officer explained:
The lawyers warned us about what we were doing, but didn't drive the process. They warned us that the option agreement locked us with Picasso and left us vulnerable. So the lawyers did their jobs. But we went ahead anyway because we figured that Picasso would treat us fairly.
As this quotation suggests, one reason that selling firm leaders took fewer precautions during legaliza- 
Due diligence, deal terms "Manufacturing will get pulled in to help evaluate different companies, which one is further along, which one has good parts that they've picked, things like that." (VP, technical integration) Implemented milestone-based acquisition pricing structure.
Rocket/North None No mention. Due diligence, deal terms "Everything was done in due diligence." (head of business unit) "Our ambition with the term sheet is basically to get in and do some due diligence, to make sure the technical side is working." (M&A manager) "We had discussions about splitting that valuation in terms of earnouts or some conditional arrangements, where once they demonstrate that the products work, and we get customers and we get benefits, they get benefits as well." (M&A manager)
Trend/Armor Due diligence "Since it's a public company, you get the analysts' reports, so you have some insight. There was widespread consensus from the analysts' standpoint." (CEO)
Due diligence "We began talking to various companies in the industry. . . . We figured we'd have as much knowledge as we possibly could." (VP, business development) "We've met with the management team and hired an investment bank to look at their business prospects.
We did a careful analysis of issues like stock overhang." (venture capitalist/board member) "We knew that our competitor had been in there for weeks doing due diligence on them. So we figured that clearly everything was OK inside the company. So it's purely deduction-a calculated risk, in which we relied on the fact that our competitor was good enough that they would not screw up a due-diligence process." (VP, business development)
Isle/Harbor None No mention. Due diligence, deal terms "We did due diligence on the financial front with the CFO's group. We looked at payment mechanisms they had. The engineering guy who took a look was our head engineer, who met with their head engineer and pronounced it sound." (manager of strategy) Implemented extended "no-shop" agreement.
Concept/Karma Limited due diligence "The investors did a bunch of references on [new buyer CEO] and they knew who he was." (CEO)
Due diligence, deal terms
Buyer "had done all the due diligence-they got one of their board members to do the due diligence on the technology and he blessed it." (seller venture capitalist/ board member) Implemented one-way "no-shop" agreement, escrow provisions.
Continued tion is that, unlike buyers, they believed they were dealing with trustworthy parties. One seller reasoned:
You have to know who you're working with and whether you can trust them. No matter how long the document, no matter what the reps and warranties and indemnifications, you can never capture in a document the spirit of the deal. And it's going to work not because of the document you create, but because of the way the two parties work together.
Due diligence and contractual safeguards simply did not seem necessary to sellers when dealing with trusted buyers. This pattern of behavior raises the question of how buyers could engage in extensive due diligence and propose complex deal terms without raising doubts in sellers' minds about whether buyers trusted them or were trustworthy. Buyers succeeded in this behavior partly by designating specific roles to be played by different individuals within their firms. The individual who had socialized with the seller stayed away from difficult conversations. A vice president at Trend explained:
[Our chief financial officer] did the negotiation-I don't do negotiating, because I'm supposed to be their friend. And that's one of the things we do: we divide up the responsibility. There is a Dr. No. I stay pristine because I'm the bear-hug guy. . . . So Dr. No is the CFO.
Ciao employed a similar separation of roles when legalizing the deal with Goalie. This strategy allowed sellers to attribute an individual's aggressive bargaining behavior to the characteristics of this person, rather than to the characteristics of a buying firm as a whole. When dealing with the tough CEO of Ciao, Goalie's leaders attributed his behavior to being new at his job: "I could not get a feeling for him. He was more evasive. And that was because he just started. He had a ton of cleaning up to do." Separation of roles led sellers to continue to trust and feel trusted by buyers, even as buyers protected their own interests.
Implementation: Distrust and Misperceptions of Seller Goals
A surprising aspect of buyers' behavior during acquisition negotiations was their apparent lack of concern with the potential consequences of deception. Negotiation-related deception might never be revealed (some buyers commented that even after deals had closed, sellers did not realize they had been deceived), and it was viewed as only slightly reprehensible, suggesting that even if caught by their negotiation counterparts, deceivers might not suffer substantial repercussions. However, material deception was another matter. Before deal close, selling firm leaders discussed a variety of goals with buyers and typically believed they had established satisfactory informal agreements regarding issues such as the destiny of the seller's technologies, the degree of autonomy acquired leaders would have in the combined firm, and employee terminations and relocations. After the deals closed, if buyers began to implement layoffs, relocations, and other unexpected strategic changes, sellers could realize they had been deceived. Moreover, material deception occurred only in situations in which sellers trusted their buyers, suggesting sellers could feel particularly betrayed when this deception was revealed. Even if the buyers felt that material deception was morally justifiable, it would seem to be a poor strategy for retaining and motivating acquired employees.
One potential explanation for buyers' readiness to engage in material deception (despite knowing they were likely to be caught) is that buyers were acquiring companies primarily for their assets, and they were not concerned with whether acquired personnel remained with the firms. However, as in other studies of technology acquisitions (Graebner, 2004; Granstrand & Sjolander, 1990; Ranft & Lord, 2002) , the data suggest that retaining acquired employees was essential for realizing value from these deals. One buyer noted, "Unless you retain the leadership of the talent, you discount what you've acquired fairly substantially." Similarly, a leader at Checkmate, one of the most deceptive buyers, commented, "We are buying the top management team." Buyers' inclination to behave deceptively seemed to arise not from a willingness to lose acquired personnel, but from a belief that despite being betrayed, acquirees could be retained and motivated by appropriate financial incentives and contractual terms. Because they distrusted their targets, buyers doubted sellers' stated goals and priorities, believing sellers exaggerated their nonmonetary concerns. Table 8 summarizes evidence regarding sellers' actual goals and buyers' beliefs about sellers' goals. A board member at Ciao dismissed Goalie's statements about location, layoffs, and autonomy, describing them as "blah blah blah" and "playing mouthpiece." He claimed that Goalie's leaders "undoubtedly did [the acquisition] as each one of them trying to figure out, 'What's the best way to get dollars out of the system.'" Accordingly, Ciao leaders assumed that financial incentives would be sufficient to assuage any postdeal disappointments for the seller.
Such assumptions did not always prove to be accurate. For example, buyers Harbor and Checkmate distrusted their targets, but believed (correctly) that the targets trusted them. Both Harbor and Checkmate engaged in negotiation-related and material deception. The goals that Isle's leaders expressed to Harbor prior to deal close included remaining in their original location, retaining autonomy, and finding the largest audience for their technology. Isle's chief technology officer said this about himself: "Me big geek." I'm a technologist. I want to build something that I want everyone to use and tell me "In order to make the deal fairly palatable to the players, we negotiated with them on the price. They sure got a lot for a short amount of work, so I don't think they're unhappy." Location. Sellers preferred that the company remain in its current location. Harbor's leaders justified this behavior as necessary to close the deal and avoid being exploited by Isle. At the same time, Harbor's leaders were relatively unconcerned about deceiving Isle, because they believed that economic incentives would ultimately pacify Isle's leaders. As a manager at Harbor recalled, "In order to make the deal fairly palatable to the players, we negotiated with them on the price. They sure got a lot for a short amount of work, so I don't think they're unhappy." Harbor's management viewed Isle's financial gain as fair compensation for relocation, loss of autonomy, and changes in technical direction. [Isle leaders] genuinely felt that Harbor had committed to them that they could do their own thing. And they just could not tolerate the fact that it would not be that way. The founders were very unhappy with the way this was going. These people are walking away from a lot of money. The guy who just left walked away from everything that was not vested.
Although still convinced that their deceptive tactics had served the purpose of closing the deal, Harbor leaders began to realize that they had lost valuable assets when Isle's management departed. As a Harbor executive commented: "The acquisition obviously was a disaster." Another example of a buyer's erroneous assumptions about seller motives is the acquisition of Spur and Prime by Checkmate. The CEOs of both selling firms were experienced leaders who valued having influence and believed Checkmate had agreed to provide them with considerable responsibility. The CEO of Prime said, "I have an employment agreement, but I've expressed myself to [Checkmate] that as long as I'm helping, I'll be here." Similarly, the CEO of Spur reported this: "What I've told Check- Instead, Checkmate's CEO felt that the "economic umbilical cord" was the "single best way to keep somebody." When Checkmate failed to provide influential positions, the CEOs of both Prime and Spur became discontented and exited Checkmate only months after their companies were acquired. Spur's leader explained that even before he left the firm, he began withdrawing from his responsibilities: "At some point I realized I was just in for the ride, so I hung out and didn't do much. There's definitely some bitterness. I feel I've been used." Firm leaders seemed unhappily surprised by these events, describing the results of the acquisition as "abysmal" and "nonfunctioning."
DISCUSSION
The objective of this study was to explore trust and deception in acquisitions. In contrast to the prevailing assumption in interorganizational trust research that the members of a dyad share trusting beliefs-that is, the assumption that trust is symmetric across a dyad (Dyer & Chu, 2000 Lui & Ngo, 2004; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Schoorman et al., 2007; Zaheer & Harris, 2005 )-I found a more complex pattern. Buyers and sellers often had asymmetric views regarding whether trust was important in choosing a partner and whether their counterparts were trustworthy. Moreover, both buyers' and sellers' assessments of their counterparts' trust and trustworthiness were often mistaken. Table 9 summarizes these asymmetries and errors. This study has also explored underlying causes for the trust asymmetries between buyers and sellers and argued that these imbalances foster seller vulnerability and buyer deceit.
In the discussion below, I examine the implications of these findings for developing a broader theory of trust asymmetries in both acquisitions and other interorganizational relationships. In a recent assessment of the state of organizational trust research, Gulati and Sytch identified trust asymmetries as an important theoretical gap, asking, "What are the antecedents of such asymmetries, how sustainable are those asymmetries, and what implications could they have for behavioral dynamics in the dyad? " (2008: 277) . Two other recent appraisals of interorganizational trust research (Schoorman et al., 2007; Zaheer & Harris, 2005 ) also identified trust asymmetries as a significant gap in extant theory. The following discussion is intended to begin to address this oversight by examining the emergence, persistence, and consequences of trust asymmetries.
Trust Asymmetries: Emergence, Persistence, and Consequences
Emergence. I earlier observed that buyers and sellers often held asymmetric views of one anoth- (Table 9 , column 1) and argued that this pattern emerged from a combination of several factors. First, both buyers and sellers had a general distrust of other firms, heightened by their competitive, "land-grab" industry environment. Second, sellers expected to lose power after the acquisitions closed, while buyers expected to gain power. This disparity led sellers to favor the few buyers they trusted; but buyers did not discriminate between trusted and distrusted targets.
Although these factors may partially reflect the specific characteristics of the time period and of acquisition transactions, there is reason to believe that similar patterns may sometimes emerge in other settings. Even in less intensely competitive environments, firm leaders may be inclined to distrust most potential partners because of in-group/ out-group bias (Williams, 2007) . In any transaction involving a shift in power, the "losing" party is likely to favor those few partners it trusts, but the "gaining" party has no reason to reciprocate; instead, a combination of competitive dynamics and in-group bias may lead the "gaining" party to adopt a default position of distrust. The result is that many transactions entail trust by one partner but distrust by another.
The current study focused on acquisitions, yet other transactions in which one actor voluntarily cedes power to another may have similar asymmetries, with the actor "losing power" favoring trusted partners while the actor "gaining power" does not. Examples of such transactions include managers' and union leaders' selection of an arbitrator to resolve a labor dispute; industry leaders' creation of a "self-policing" or "watchdog" organization; or even the selection of a new dean by a faculty hiring committee. In all of these examples, both parties begin with the ability to walk away, but after the decision is made, one party must submit to the power of the other. Hence, we might expect the parties to employ differing screening criteria, leading to trust asymmetries.
The emergence of trust asymmetries need not be limited to situations involving an impending asymmetry in power, however. Trust asymmetries may also arise when two parties have unequal information about one another, as might be the case, for instance, when one firm is more established and better-known than its counterpart. More generally, when facing any risky transaction, firms may choose either to transact only with trusted partners, or to exercise vigilance with whatever partner they choose. Any occasion in which one party chooses trust while the other chooses vigilance can create initial trust asymmetries. Furthermore, under certain conditions, trust asymmetries may persist for some period of time.
Persistence. Prior theory has suggested that trust imbalances will be short-lived. If one party trusts another, the trusted party will feel obliged to reciprocate, leading to symmetric trust (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003; Zaheer & Harris, 2005) . Alternately, if one party distrusts another, the distrusted party will lose faith, leading to the development of symmetrical distrust (Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2007) . This argument requires making two assumptions. The first is that firm X's leaders realize they are trusted by firm Y. This assumption is based on the belief that firm X accurately interprets Y's behavior-for instance, information sharing rather than monitoring-as signaling trust rather than distrust (Das & Teng, 1998; Ferrin et al., 2007) . The second assumption is that believing firm Y trusts them causes firm X's leaders to trust firm Y in return (e.g., Ferrin et al., 2007; Johnson, Cullen, Sakano, & Takenouchi, 1996) . This relationship has often been posited without a specific rationale (e.g., Das & Teng, 1998; Serva, Fuller, & Mayer, 2005) . However, one possible explanation draws upon links between affect and trust (e.g., Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; McAllister, 1995) . Knowing they are trusted may lead firm leaders to experience positive affect, which may in turn lead to trust. Conversely, knowing that they are distrusted could foster negative affect, leading to distrust.
The current study suggests that neither of these two assumptions may be entirely accurate. As columns 4 and 5 of Table 9 indicate, both firms' assessments of whether their counterparts trusted them were frequently mistaken. This was particularly true for sellers, who often believed their buyers trusted them when the opposite was true. This study suggests several reasons why firm leaders may not accurately assess whether they are trusted by their counterparts, even after observing behavior such as information sharing or monitoring. First, communication may hold different meanings for the trusting and distrusting parties. The trusting party may view social interaction and information sharing as building trust, while the distrusting party primarily views these activities as an opportunity for ingratiation and strategic reconnaissance. Second, monitoring activities may be delegated only to a few individuals within the distrusting firm. The trusting party may attribute monitoring behavior to the characteristics of those individuals, rather than reassessing its views of the firm as a whole.
Even if firm leaders accurately assess whether they are trusted or distrusted by their counterparts, it is not clear that this will cause leaders to change their own beliefs to match. As columns 6 and 7 in Table 9 indicate, firm leaders frequently distrusted their counterparts but felt trusted by them, or vice versa. These mismatches occurred in either of two scenarios. In one scenario, firm leaders trusted their partners, but felt they were distrusted in return. This was the case for the leaders of sellers Concept and Isle and buyer Karma. In all three cases, firm leaders felt that they were distrusted because of a misunderstanding or an event beyond their control. Concept's CEO believed his forthrightness during a breakfast meeting was misconstrued; Isle believed Harbor was wary because of a prior deal gone bad; and Karma believed Concept was nervous because Karma had to pull out of early negotiations after it had itself received an acquisition offer. None of these "depersonalized" explanations for being distrusted seemed to produce negative affect or to trigger reciprocal distrust. Weber, Malhotra, and Murnighan (2005) provided a complementary argument, suggesting that vulnerable parties may ameliorate their anxiety through motivated cognition, in effect convincing themselves that the more powerful party is trustworthy. As a power-reducing transaction moves forward, the trustor may become increasingly powerless. This may encourage individuals to stick to their trusting beliefs despite feeling they are distrusted in return.
In a second scenario, firm leaders distrust their partners, but feel that they are trusted. This was the case for buyers Ciao, Harbor, Picasso, and Checkmate. These buyers believed they were simply more savvy than their sellers. A vice president of Ciao (a firm that was itself still private and had not done any prior acquisitions) compared his firm favorably to Goalie, commenting, "They actually had a lot of naivete." A common feature of both mismatch scenarios is that firm leaders interpreted trust imbalances in ways that reflected positively, or at least not negatively, on themselves. Such positive interpretation may have removed any impetus to change their beliefs. This pattern is consistent with other evidence that trusting (or distrusting) beliefs are not easily altered. For example, a distrusting party that is engaging in active vigilance and monitoring is unlikely to ever develop trust in its counterpart (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996; Strickland, 1958) .
Consequences. Finally, this study's findings suggest potential consequences of trust asymmetries. I find that trust asymmetries foster both negotiationrelated and material deception, though in somewhat different ways. Deception is only eliminated in the condition of perceived symmetrical trust, in which an actor both trusts and feels trusted by its counterpart. Material deception only occurs in the asymmetrical scenario in which a party distrusts but feels trusted by its counterpart. Prior theory suggests that if focal firm leaders believe their counterparts are trusting, these leaders will refrain from opportunism out of a sense of moral obligation and out of concern about potential harm to the relationship and to the focal firm's reputation (Larson, 1992 ). However, this study suggests that even if a firm's leaders view another party as trusting, the leaders may feel no sense of moral obligation if the other party is not viewed as trustworthy. Moreover, negative consequences only deter deception if the firm's leaders believe that the deception will be revealed and that the deceived party cannot be pacified through another means. For example, in this sample buyers typically felt that negotiationrelated deception would not be revealed and that financial incentives could counteract material deception. Because buyers did not typically trust their sellers, they did not accept sellers' representations that other issues were as important as financial gain. Because tendencies to deceive are greater when the costs to others are perceived to be low (Gneezy, 2005) , this discounting of sellers' nonfinancial motives may have further encouraged buyers' deceit. As a result, as columns 2 and 3 of Table  9 indicate, trusted parties, particularly buyers, often engaged in deception. Furthermore, this deception often went undetected, because trusting parties did not feel the need to engage in due diligence or other forms of vigilance.
Limitations and Future Research
As with all case study research, an important issue is the degree to which the findings are generalizable to a broader sample. This is ultimately an empirical question that will be answered only by future studies. However, a variety of indicators suggest that this study's findings may generalize to other acquisitions. First, like the cases in this study, the majority of U.S. mergers and acquisitions involve privately held targets (Capron & Shen, 2007) ; are conducted in friendly rather than hostile negotiating conditions (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001 ); and occur during wave periods, which coincide with high market valuations (Maksimovic & Phillips, 2001; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005) . Evidence also suggests that acquisitions in the study time frame were similar in important respects to acquisitions that have occurred in other time periods. For example, the financial returns for most 1998 -2001 acquirers were only "trivially" different from acquisition returns in the preceding 20 years (Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stultz, 2005: 763) .
Nevertheless, other types of acquisitions may differ in ways that influence the dynamics of trust. The acquisitions studied here were primarily motivated by a desire to create competitive advantage through valuable and inimitable resources. Some acquisitions may be motivated by a transaction cost logic, which could possibly lead to different patterns of trust and deception. In addition, these sellers were relatively high-performing firms, and so they had the opportunity to decline buyers they did not find attractive. In acquisitions of distressed firms, managers may be forced to sell to acquirers that they distrust. In addition, if a seller is a public firm with greater exposure to shareholder lawsuits, we might expect investors and board members to demand that the target simply accept the highest acquisition offer, regardless of whether firm leaders trust the buyer. However, anecdotal evidence suggests this is not always the case. For example, litigation following the Daimler-Chrysler merger suggests that Chrysler's investors trusted DaimlerBenz's leaders and were angry to find that the buyer's informal promises were not fulfilled after deal close.
Another factor that may lead to different patterns of trust in acquisitions is whether buyer and seller have prior acquisition experience. Acquisition experience could theoretically influence sellers, making them more skeptical of buyers' promises, or could influence buyers, either making them more cynical and deceptive, or perhaps making them more aware of the potential negative effects of deception. A comparison of the more and less experienced buyers and sellers in this sample did not provide clear evidence of such patterns, but differences might be apparent in a larger sample. If a buyer had conducted prior acquisitions, this could also provide the seller with better information regarding the buyer's trustworthiness in subsequent acquisitions. However, as argued earlier, even behavior in previous acquisitions was not a particularly reliable guide to a buyer's future actions, given the heterogeneity of acquisition events.
A final area for future research is trust asymmetries in other types of interorganizational transactions, including strategic alliances. In prior work the typical assumption has been that trust within an alliance is symmetric (e.g., Dyer & Chu, 2000 Lui & Ngo, 2004; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Schoorman et al., 2007; Zaheer & Harris, 2005) . However, this assumption may not always be accurate. For example, Zhang and Rajagopalan (2002) found evidence that international joint venture partners may differ in their abilities to exert a credible threat of retaliation for bad behavior. It seems plausible that such disparities could lead to differences in the degree to which each partner trusts its counterpart.
Conclusion
This study's aim was to explore issues of trust and deception in acquisitions. In this research I moved beyond the oft-studied setting of long-term buyer-supplier alliances and observed how a different context-mergers and acquisitions-may influence the development of trust. In addition, this study provides insights into trust asymmetries, an area that several scholars have identified as a significant void in interorganizational trust theory.
I conclude with some advice for managers, particularly entrepreneurs. Smaller firms have received little attention in research on interorganizational relationships, although these firms may have different viewpoints and face distinctive risks in both alliances (Alvarez & Barney, 2001; Prashantham & Birkinshaw, 2008) and acquisitions (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004) . This study suggests that the role of seller is a difficult one, with no obvious solution. Strategies that have been suggested as ways to reduce deception in negotiations, such as screening potential partners on the basis of reputation or developing a social relationship prior to negotiating (Schweitzer, 2005) , may actually increase a seller's vulnerability. Both practices are likely to increase a seller's trust in a buyer, but since trustworthiness cannot be predicted with certainty from either past behavior or social interaction, any sense of security may be false. The best advice for sellers may be to retain their skepticism. A leading technology investment banker, dubbed by another informant the "king of M&A," gave the following words of caution:
Some buyers can put out a lot of bulls__. "We'll make you CEO, we'll make you president, you'll be the next guy in line." I've told my client, "This is bulls__. You know this is not a commitment. I read this guy, and he is not going to do it. If you are fine with this, and you just want more money, that is fine, but if you are thinking you are going to be the CEO, don't do it for that reason."
Rather than relying on trust, a seller may be better off exercising an abundance of caution. As trustworthy as a buyer may seem, a seller would be wise to verify the buyer's statements, ensure that important issues are resolved in written contracts, and follow the advice of experienced attorneys. To do any less may simply set a seller up for future disappointment.
